U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School
Monograph Series

THE COME-AS-YOU-ARE WAR: FORT SILL AND OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

by
Boyd L. Dastrup

Office of the Command Historian
United States Army Field Artillery Center and School
Fort Sill, Oklahoma

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Brigadier General William J. Lennox, Jr.	Deputy Commanding General-Training
Dr. Boyd L. Dastrup	Command Historian

U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School Monograph Series

BOYD L. DASTRUP

Boyd L. Dastrup, a native of Ogden, Utah, received his B.A. from Weber State College, M.A. from Utah State University, and Ph.D. from Kansas State University. He has served as Center Historian, Sheppard Technical Training Center, Sheppard AFB, Texas, and is currently the Army's Field Artillery Branch Historian, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He has written The U.S. Army Command and Staff College: A Centennial History (1981), Crusade in Nuremberg: U.S. Military Occupation, 1945-1949 (1984), King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field Artillery (1992), Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973-1991 (1994), and The Field Artillery: History and Sourcebook (1994).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

USAFACS Page..... i
Preface..... vi
Chapter I: The Initial American Response..... 1
Chapter II: Deploying Fort Sill Units..... 6
Chapter III: Mobilizing the Reserve Components... 39

Conclusion..... 63
List of Acronyms..... 67
Appendix A: Active and Reserve Component Units Deployed from Fort Sill..... 69
Appendix B: Reserve Units Mobilized for Base Operations Support..... 70
Bibliographical Essay of Select Sources..... 71

PREFACE

Over a span of seven months, Fort Sill participated in the largest mobilization of American military forces since the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s. During late 1990 and early 1991, the installation deployed III Corps Artillery

units and mobilized Reserve Component units and individuals to serve as part of a multi-national military force to contain Iraqi aggression and to liberate Kuwait. Given the rapid buildup and improvisation at higher headquarters, Fort Sill had to respond rapidly and professionally to constantly changing circumstances.

This monograph is not the story of combat operations that generally attracts the headlines and garners the glory, but it is an account of a heroic but unsung effort to ensure that soldiers and equipment being sent from Fort Sill were prepared for combat before being shipped into the theater of operations.

I would like to thank Major General (R) Raphael J. Hallada, former Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, and Colonel (R) James R. Russell, the former Director of the Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization, for reading the entire manuscript and making appropriate comments. I would also like to thank David Grady of the Directorate of Logistics, for reading a portion of the manuscript.

Boyd L. Dastrup, Ph.D.
Command Historian
U.S. Army Field Artillery
Center and Fort Sill

CHAPTER I

THE INITIAL AMERICAN RESPONSE

Although it had responded ambiguously to the tense relationship between Iraq and Kuwait through the first part of 1990, the United States reacted resolutely when Iraq invaded

Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Under the code name of Operation Desert Shield, the United States in cooperation with the United Nations rapidly dispatched military forces to deter any further Iraqi aggression and simultaneously called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait. When diplomatic overtures and economic sanctions failed to resolve the crisis, the United States and its United Nations allies launched the military operation, Operation Desert Storm, to force the Iraqis to leave Kuwait.

On 2 August 1990 an elite vanguard of the Iraqi army smashed across the border of the oil-rich state of Kuwait after Iraq and Kuwait had been unable to resolve serious differences between them over oil production and other pressing and controversial issues. Driving past custom houses along the frontier, three Republican Guard Forces Command divisions (two armored and one mechanized), equipped with Soviet and Western military technology, rushed to crush any Kuwaiti opposition. Conducting the main attack, the Hammurabi Armored and Tawakalna Mechanized Divisions raced towards Kuwait City. Concurrently, the Medina Armored Division moved south to establish blocking positions on the main avenues of approach from the Saudi Arabian border.[1]

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[1]Department of Defense (DOD), Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim Report to Congress, Apr 92, p. 3, hereafter cited as Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; Briefing, subj: Iraq Invaded Kuwait, 1990, Historical Records and Document Collection (HRDC), Command Historian's Office, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS).

While the emir of Kuwait and other high-ranking government officials were escaping to safety, Iraqi forces rolled over surprised and ineffective opposition. Awakened by machine gun fire, exploding rockets from attack helicopters, artillery barrages, and jet aircraft roaring overhead, the Kuwaitis offered only uncoordinated resistance despite individual acts of bravery and were quickly crushed by Iraqi military forces. As Republic Guard infantry divisions began mopping up the remaining resistance, the three heavy Guard divisions sped southward to establish a defensive line along the Saudi border to place Iraqi forces in a position to invade Saudi Arabia if desired.[2]

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[2]Ibid.; Robert H. Scales, Jr., et al, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993), pp. 44-55; Steve Niva, "The Battle is Joined," in Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck, eds., The Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader (New

York: Olive Branch Press, 1991), pp. 55-56; Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, MD: The Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 35-42; "Chronology," Military Review, Sep 91, p. 65; "The Road to War: A Behind the Scenes Account of Gross Errors and Deft Maneuvers," Newsweek, 28 Jan 91, p. 58.

Iraqi aggression caught the administration of President George Bush off guard. During the preceding weeks, the approaching reunification of Germany, President Mikhail Gorbachev's difficulties in the Soviet Union, and the intricacies of finding a nominee to replace Justice William Brennan on the U.S. Supreme Court had absorbed the administration's attention. Pushing these critical issues temporarily aside, the Bush administration identified Saddam Hussein's threat to the world's vital oil supplies, his nuclear weapons program, his challenge to the credibility of American leadership in the post-Cold War world, and Israeli security as crucial American national interests that justified some type of response. Ironically, the invasion came on the precise day that President Bush was in Aspen, Colorado, presenting for the first time the nation's new defense strategy for the 1990s and beyond that took into account the vast changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and reduction of U.S. military budgets and forces.[3]

Going beyond outlining the perceived threats to American interests, the administration quickly rallied support from other world powers. The United States energized diplomatic channels with the United Kingdom, France, and other countries to arrange an official condemnation of the Iraqi action and to demand Iraq's immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. That same day, President Bush froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, banned American trade with Iraq, halted all American arms deliveries to Iraq, and called upon other countries to take similar action. Shortly thereafter, the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets. In the meantime, the Soviet Union suspended military shipments to Iraq to signal that it was a responsible member of the world community in order to obtain badly needed

[3]Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, p. 13.

western economic aid. On 4 August 1990 the twelve-member European Community condemned Iraq for its actions and imposed sanctions and an embargo.[4]

[4]"Chronology," pp. 65-66.

In the meantime, the United Nations Security Council became actively involved in the crisis. On 2 August 1990, influenced by the United States, it passed Resolution 660 that condemned Iraq's invasion of a neighboring country and demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Four days later on the sixth, the United States and Great Britain pushed through the United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 that imposed a sweeping economic boycott of Iraq. The following day, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 665 that called upon member nations with warships in the region to enforce the economic sanctions by stopping ships traveling to Iraq, by inspecting them, and by forcing them to turn around if necessary.[5]

After receiving the official Saudi request for assistance on 6 August 1990, President Bush declared on the following day that "a line has been drawn in the sand" and ordered American military forces into the Persian Gulf as part of a

[5]"Niva: The Battle is Joined," pp. 56-57; Friedman, Desert Victory, pp. 52, 67; Henry O. Malone, Jr., ed., TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Preliminary Study (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992), p. 3; "Chronology," pp. 65-66.

multinational force. The initial American forces included elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing, and pre-positioned naval vessels from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Shortly thereafter, a Marine amphibious brigade arrived in the theater and was followed in the ensuing weeks by the XVIII Airborne Corps, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the 1st Cavalry Division, all from the United States. By late August 1990 the United States had deployed approximately sixty thousand soldiers, airmen, and sailors to Kuwait to defend the tiny country. The above American units were reinforced by the Kansas-based 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and followed after 8 November 1990 by the VII Corps, the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions, the forward brigade of the 2nd Armored Division, all stationed in Germany, and other units. By 16 February 1991 American military forces, composed of sailors, airmen, and soldiers, exceeded 527,000 and were part of a coalition military force from thirty-six nations created to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Of that number, the Army contributed more than 350,000 from Active and Reserve
Component forces.[6]

[6]Scales, et al, Certain Victory, pp. 40-41; "Chronology," p. 66; Niva, "The Battle is Joined," p. 58; "Units Part of Rapid Deployment Force," Lawton Constitution, 8 Aug 90, p. 1a; Msg, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) to AIG 7406, subj: USCINCCENT Public Affairs Themes, 151401Z Aug 90, Morris Swett Technical Library (MSTL), USAFAS; Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p. 5; Memorandum for Assistant Commandant (AC), USAFAS, subj: Chronology of Field Artillery Preparation in Operation Desert Storm, 18 Jul 91, HRDC.

CHAPTER II
DEPLOYING FORT SILL UNITS

Fort Sill quickly found itself caught up in a flurry of activity to support Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Although the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), Major General Raphael J. Hallada, did not know the exact level of Fort Sill's participation at the beginning of the crisis, he anticipated the role ahead and took firm action. He instructed the installation to pull together all of its assets to support any possible American military involvement. Subsequently, the Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization (DPTM) under Colonel James R. Russell, which coordinated the installation's deployment and mobilization effort, conducted a strategy meeting on 9 August 1990 involving the Commanding General; the Chief of Staff, USAFACFS, Colonel (later Major General) Robert H. Scales, Jr.; the Commanding General, III Corps Artillery, Brigadier General (later Major General) Frank L. Miller, Jr.; the Directorate of Logistics (DOL) under Gregory H. Kirkwood; and the Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA) under Sherman O. Ayers to coordinate all support for Operation Desert Shield and to prioritize the post's efforts. At the group's recommendation, Fort Sill expanded the labors of its emergency operations center that had been activated on 8 August 1990 to monitor the crisis and its logistical operations center that had been activated on 2 August 1990 to around the clock operations beginning on 10 August 1990.[1]

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[1]Memorandum for Chief of Staff, subj: Annual Historical Review (AHR), 1 Feb 91, HRDC; Memorandum for Command Historian Office, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), subj: AHR, 29 Jan 91, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup with MG Raphael J. Hallada, 13 Mar 91, pp. 1-2, HRDC; Msg (S), subj: Activation of Ft. Sill's EOC, 1534/081090, Aug 90, MSTL, information used is unclassified; Memorandum for Cdr, U.S. Army Combined Arms

Training Activity (USACATA), subj: After Action Review (AAR) for Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, HRDC.

Although normal daily operational requirements would continue at the U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center (USAFATC) for initial entry training and advanced individual training and at the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) for officers and noncommissioned officers, Fort Sill officials made the decision early in August that Operation Desert Shield would take precedence over everything else that the installation was doing. From their perspective, General Hallada and his staff had to prepare Fort Sill units for possible deployment, and they had to mobilize Reserve Component units, as required, for service in Southwest Asia. "That was the number one priority," explained General Hallada.[2]

[2]Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Hallada, 13 Mar 91, pp. 7-9, HRDC.

Although Fort Sill made some key decisions concerning priorities, it could still only speculate about the extent of its role during the first two weeks of August 1990. For the most part, guidance from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) was vague and sometimes even contradictory. Even so, Fort Sill anticipated being actively involved. It projected dispatching mobile training teams from the Field Artillery School to train units being deployed, and it envisioned providing individuals with critical military occupational specialties (MOS) as filler personnel in deploying units. Realizing that sending whole units was not out of the realm of the possible, based upon message traffic that was flowing into the post from various Army commands since 2 August 1990, Fort Sill identified some units for potential deployment, should the Army asked for recommendations. Equally important, the installation determined that all equipment would be shipped at wartime readiness, that deploying units would be properly manned, and that all personnel would be qualified with their personal weapons, trained in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare, and would be capable of accomplishing their missions. Given the serious nature of the crisis, quality would not be sacrificed to expedite deployment or mobilization.[3]

At the same time, General Hallada added another equally significant condition that governed Fort Sill's effort during the Persian Gulf crisis. Perceiving the potential magnitude of the post's involvement, he emphasized that supporting

[3]Ibid., pp. 1-3; Msg (S), Fort Sill to Forces J-3, subj: Activation of Fort Sill EOC, 1534/081090, information used is unclassified, MSTL; "Sill Ready If Needed in Middle East," Fort Sill Cannoneer, 16 Aug 90, p. 1a; Staff Input, subj: 1990 USAFACFS AHR, 29 Jan 91, p. 3, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, USACATA, subj: AAR for Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, HRDC.

Operation Desert Shield, regardless of the level of participation, had to be "a team effort . . . to get the job done. All of Fort Sill had to cooperate. . . . No one agency would shoulder the task alone. It would be a shared effort."[4]

DEPLOYMENT BEGINS

[4]Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Hallada, 13 Mar 91, p. 3. HRDC.

As anticipated by many Fort Sill leaders, speculation about the level of participation came to a rapid halt by the middle of August 1990. Message traffic and telephone calls from major Army commands indicated that units from Fort Sill would indeed be deployed. The only questions that remained at the time were which units would deploy and when and whether they would deploy as a whole. These questions were soon answered. On 17 August 1990 ten III Corps Artillery units stationed at Fort Sill received alert notices for movement to the Persian Gulf.[5]

The alert notices heightened the already existing sense of urgency for III Corps Artillery. For the first time in over forty years, it would be sending units overseas to fight if necessary. Interestingly, some units had not left Fort Sill even for training at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, since they had been assigned to the post. Even though the initial fighting had come to a standstill once Iraq had conquered Kuwait, III Corps Artillery units had to assume "a worse case posture," according to General Miller. They had to be prepared to fight the moment that they arrived in the theater of action and could not suppose that they would have time to train before fighting. Any less degree of

[5]1990 USAFACFS AHR, pp. 25-26.

preparedness could lead to disaster.[6]

[6]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Larry M. Kaplan, Assistant Command Historian, with CG, III Corps Artillery, BG Frank L. Miller, Jr., 2 Apr 91, p. 4, HRDC.

In the words of General Miller, the alert notices, even though foreseen, came as a "bit of a surprise."[7] For years III Corps Artillery had had the deployment mission of moving to Europe, picking up pre-positioned equipment there that could be matched with equipment shipped in by air, and aiding in repelling a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe in cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. In view of this long-standing strategy, III Corps Artillery personnel had grown comfortable with their mission. Reorienting their thinking from Europe to the Persian Gulf was difficult to do. III Corps Artillery would have to deploy with all its equipment and could not depend upon stocks in Saudi Arabia to augment it.[8] In the words of General Miller, "We had to go to war, and we had to go to war in an environment that was totally foreign to anything that we had ever previously done."[9]

As General Miller's comment suggested, III Corps Artillery approached the deployment warily but confidently. The corps had not expected deploying into the Gulf or any other place for that matter prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, nor had it trained for such a contingency. Such a deployment would be a new experience because III Corps

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[7]Ibid., pp. 1-3.

[8]Ibid., pp. 1-7.

[9]Ibid., p. 1.

Artillery was not part of the Army's contingency forces that were trained and designed for short-notice deployments. Focused on NATO, it was not prepared for such operations.[10]

The 47th Field Hospital's and U.S. Army Medical Department Activity (MEDDAC), Reynolds Army Community Hospital's Role

[10]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Cdr, 212th Field Artillery Brigade, Col Floyd T. Banks, 19 Jun 91, p. 5, HRDC.

Of the III Corps Artillery units, the 47th Field Hospital left first. To fill out the unit, the Army sent doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel from all over the nation to complement those being transferred to Southwest Asia theater from the Reynolds Army Community Hospital at Fort Sill. During a period of two weeks, 47th Field Hospital personnel received training and learned about the culture and traditions of the people of the Persian Gulf region and how to function as a team since many of the deploying personnel had never worked together. On 27 August 1990 47th Field Hospital personnel, dressed in desert uniforms, boarded a chartered DC-10 at Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma (the aerial port of embarkation for Fort Sill personnel deployments to Southwest Asia). They joined a multinational force organized to protect Saudi Arabia from a possible Iraqi invasion. By February 1991 the 47th Field Hospital was part of a vast medical support infrastructure organized in Saudi Arabia in anticipation of

high casualties and the pervasive fear of Saddam's chemical weapons.[11]

[11]Scales, et al, Certain Victory, pp. 80-81; Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp. 33, 37, 456, 469; Msg, HQDA to AIG 7406, subj: USCINCCENT Public Affairs Themes, 151401Z Aug 90, MSTL; Situation Report, subj: Status of Shipments and Deployments, 300800Z Jan 91, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Deputy Cdr, Clinical Services, Reynolds Army Community Hospital (RACH), Col Charles R. Kuhn, and Chief, Plans, Training, and Security, RACH, Cpt Gregory R. Fumbanks, 18 Jul 91, p. 2, HRDC.

As might be expected, transferring personnel to the 47th Field Hospital abruptly and significantly altered daily activities at Reynolds Army Community Hospital. Because of a loss of approximately eighty-five percent of its professional staff -- physicians, nurses, occupational therapists, physical therapists, and others -- within a short period of time, Reynolds had to curtail operations.[12] It reduced services at outlying clinics to only active duty sick call. The hospital concentrated services for family members and retirees at its main facility. At the same time hospital officials appointed family practitioners as chiefs of specialty departments (the Department of Surgery, Department of Internal Medicine, etc.) on an interim basis because they were the only physicians left after those deploying had gone.[13]

While the Reynolds Army Community Hospital was waiting for replacement personnel, it had to care for patients, including those with special needs. Under a memorandum of agreement with local hospitals to supply bed space to Reynolds patients during times of emergency, hospital officials moved intensive care patients to the nearby Comanche County Memorial

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[12]Ibid., p. 1; "Hospital Sends Patients Off Post," Fort Sill Cannoneer, 16 Aug 90, p. 2a, HRDC.

[13]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Kuhn and Fumbanks, 18 Jul 91, pp. 1-2, HRDC; "Hospital Sends Patients Off Post," p. 1a.

Hospital and the Southwestern Medical Center, both in Lawton, Oklahoma. The transfers followed a determination as to which patients could be better served by other facilities until Reynolds learned when it would receive replacement medical practitioners. As hospitals in Lawton were receiving some patients, Reynolds evacuated others to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, for specialty treatment.[14]

[14]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Kuhn and Fumbanks, 18 Jul 91, p. 9, HRDC; "Hospital Sends Patients Off Post," p. 1a.

As soon as the U.S. Army Health Services Command had been apprised of the critical situation at Reynolds, it acted. Drawing upon other medical centers and activities throughout the Army that were not experiencing a major deployment, the Command filled most vacancies at Reynolds within forty-eight hours. The people sent to Reynolds remained there for the most part until late September 1990 and early October 1990 when U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) personnel began arriving at the hospital for active duty as part of the Reserve Component activation directed by the President. In some cases, replacements, who were assigned to Reynolds on a ninety-day temporary duty rotation, occupied positions in the hospital until December 1990.[15]

Caring for patients and simultaneously providing medical services for soldiers deploying or reservists mobilizing at Fort Sill took place during the midst of a tremendous turnover of hospital personnel. Not only did the hospital lose professionals when they were transferred to the 47th Field Hospital but also lost them to fill vacancies in other deploying medical units. Reflecting upon this hectic situation with medical personnel, the Deputy Commander, Clinical Services, Reynolds Army Community Hospital, Colonel (Dr.) Charles R. Kuhn, noted that the biggest problem was getting a call, invariably late on a Friday afternoon from Health Services Command that directed Reynolds to redistribute certain specialties and positions by the following Monday. Such a directive involved making telephone calls, locating people, cutting orders, and processing the transfers to wherever they were needed. As Colonel Kuhn recalled after the crisis was over, the directives came every Friday afternoon for five to six weeks until the situation began to stabilize.[16]

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[15]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Kuhn and Fumbanks, 18 Jul 91, pp. 2-3, HRDC.

[16]Ibid., p. 8.

The number of physicians available for patient care fluctuated daily. For example, one day the hospital might have ten physicians, and the next day only six. In other instances, conducting physical examinations for units deploying to Southwest Asia required two thirds of the staff and temporarily hampered patient care. Such needs, coupled with losses to the 47th Field Hospital and the constant turnover, taxed Reynolds Army Community Hospital's ability to provide normal services.[17]

In the face of the stresses generated by Operation Desert Shield, Colonel Kuhn found the attitude of hospital personnel to be amazingly positive. He pointed out:

> "There was never an attitude [that] there is no room. We can do this. If a problem arose that needed to be fixed, the answer was how are we going to do it. . . . I essentially heard no rumbling at all. The

[17] Ibid.

people just went and did [what they had to do]."[18] Even though people were tired from their long days, Operation Desert Shield "fever" and commitment were such that the quality of hospital services did not decline.[19]

Operation Desert Shield produced another bright spot for Reynolds Army Community Hospital. The call-up of Reserve Component personnel temporarily gave the hospital some specialties that it was not entitled to have under normal conditions, which "delighted" hospital officials, because the Health Services Command lacked sufficient people to fill those specialties during peacetime. For example, the hospital was not entitled to have a neurologist, but it had one for some time. It also briefly employed a neonatologist, who specialized in acute care of newborn babies, and a pediatric psychologist.[20]

Deployment of Troop Units from Fort Sill

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[18]Ibid., p. 9.

[19]Ibid., p. 8.

[20]Ibid., p. 9.

As Reynolds Army Community Hospital adjusted to the conditions created by the crisis, other III Corps Artillery units departed for Southwest Asia. To meet an urgent request by the Commanding General, Central Command (CENTCOM), General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Fort Sill dispatched B Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, a Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) unit from the 75th Field Artillery Brigade, on 2 September 1990 for Saudi Arabia.[21] Meanwhile, several Fort Sill units received their alert notices on 17 August 1990: the 75th Field Artillery Brigade; the 2l2th Field Artillery Brigade; 299th Engineer
Battalion; the 83rd Chemical Detachment; the 133rd Ordnance Detachment; C Battery, 25th Target Acquisition Battalion; the 225th Maintenance Company; the 226th Maintenance Company; and the 230th Finance Unit. Those units deployed from Fort Sill between 28 September 1990 and 7 October 1990.[22] Subsequently, the 471st Transportation Company, 52nd Explosive Ordnance Detachment, and 163rd Maintenance Detachment left late in December 1990 after receiving alert notices earlier in the month.[23]

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[21]Memorandum for AC, USAFAS, subj: Chronology of FA Participation in Operation Desert Shield/Storm, 18 Jul 91, HRDC. CENTCOM was one of six multi-service U.S. commands.

[22]Memorandum for Record, subj: Units Sent to Desert Storm from Fort Sill, 1990-1991, undated, HRDC.

[23]Ibid.

FORT SILL SUPPORTS THE DEPLOYMENT

Getting units ready for deployment involved long, arduous hours. Fort Sill ensured that all soldiers were qualified with the M-16 rifle, received first aid training, and underwent nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training because of the pervasive fear that Iraq would resort to biological or chemical warfare. While this training was in progress, other installation agencies processed personnel, medical, dental, legal, and financial records to ensure that they were current, a procedure known as preparation for overseas movement. Specifically, the Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA) updated personnel records and operated the Caisson Recreation Center as the post marshaling site. Reynolds Army Community Hospital screened Active Component and Reserve Component soldiers to determine their physical deployability and gave immunization shots. For Active Component as well as Reserve Component soldiers and their families, the Staff Judge Advocate General (JAG) prepared wills and powers of attorney in cooperation with the Adjutant General's Office, furnished around-the-clock, on-call legal assistance and family support briefings, and helped deploying soldiers exercise their legal rights under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.[24] As a part of this massive effort, the U.S. Army Dental Activity (DENTAC)

[24]1990 USAFACFS AHR, pp. 27-28.

provided general dental screening, took panoramic dental X-rays for casualty identification and accountability, and gave other dental support, while the Finance Office ensured that pay records were accurate and furnished casual pay as needed.[25]

[25]Ibid.; Memorandum for Cdr, USACATA, subj: AAR Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, HRDC; Memorandum for Command Historian's Office with Encl, subj: AHR, 31 Jan 92, HRDC; Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p. 21; Fact Sheet, subj: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Operations within AG, 1 Mar 91, HRDC.

While DPTM, DPCA, JAG, MEDDAC, DENTAC, and Finance focused on preparing personnel for overseas movement, other Fort Sill agencies centered their attention on deploying equipment. The Directorate of Logistics prepared equipment, operated the aerial port of embarkation at Altus Air Force Base, ran the railhead at Fort Sill, and provided a port liaison at the Port of Houston, LaPorte, Texas. The directorate also painted vehicles, repaired equipment as necessary to bring units to the proper C-rating (a readiness rating), and obtained the necessary supplies and equipment to upgrade units from a training status to a fully deployable status. By devoting such extensive energy to repairing equipment to ensure that it was in top condition before shipping it, the directorate reduced maintenance problems in combat as indicated by the Commander, 75th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Jerry L. Laws, and the Commander, 212th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, Colonel Floyd T. Banks. Simultaneously, the Law Enforcement Command secured the railhead, conducted baggage search for all personnel and outgoing cargo, and provided control at the marshaling site and Altus Air Force Base.[26]

Meanwhile, other organizations participated extensively. As a part of the deployment, the Directorate of Engineering and Housing (DEH) built a "Tent City" complete with a mess hall, a portable shower facility, and electricity at Altus Air Force Base to make life more comfortable for those waiting for flights to the Persian Gulf and monitored the impact of increased vehicle movement and equipment usage at Fort Sill to

[26]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Branch Chief, Plans and Policy Branch, Directorate of Logistics (DOL), David A. Grady, and Deputy Director, DOL, Frank C. Wong, 18 Jun 91, pp. 8-9, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, USACATA, subj: AAR Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, HRDC.

prevent any damage to the environment. The directorate also built crates and pallets and supplied portable latrines.[27]

[27]Ibid.; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Grady and Wong, 18 Jun 91, pp. 8-9, 23, HRDC.

Providing logistical support to Active and Reserve Component units exceeded expectations and dwarfed anyone's recent personal experience. Early on, installation officials learned that logistics played a major role in preparing for war.[28] To deploy units Fort Sill operated twenty-four hours a day, seven-days a week from the outset of its involvement in the crisis. In some instances, logistics personnel worked forty to fifty straight hours to validate equipment for deployment because the installation was operating under peacetime manpower strengths and did not have additional personnel to meet the needs generated by Operation Desert Shield.[29]

Once the equipment had been validated for deployment, shipment actually began. As General Hallada recounted, at one time every mile of track on the post was covered with railroad cars. Miles of loaded cars were also on sidings outside of Fort Sill. One time, Fort Sill actually ran out of railroad cars and had to bring in more. By the time that the last unit had left the installation early in February 1991, the Directorate of Logistics had loaded twenty-two trains with a mixture of field artillery, engineer, medical, finance, maintenance, transportation, supply and service, target acquisition, and chemical equipment for Active and Reserve Component units. The equipment moved from Fort Sill to two ports in Texas (Houston and Beaumont) where it was loaded on

[28]Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[29]Ibid., pp. 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 26.

thirty-four ships bound for Saudia Arabia.[30]

[30]Memorandum for Command Historian, subj: AHR, 29 Jan 91, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Grady and Wong, 18 Jun 91, p. 27, HRDC.

Behind the impressive scenes of loaded railroad cars headed for ports and soldiers boarding aircraft stood the stark reality of logistical support. Upon learning which units were going to Southwest Asia, Fort Sill rapidly identified those that did not have all of their equipment and started the complicated process of finding it on post or at other Army installations. Because Fort Sill had difficulties determining excesses at other Army installations for cross-leveling III Corps Artillery units, providing effective logistical support proved to be challenging. The inability to examine excess assets throughout the Army forced the Directorate of Logistics to limits its searches to Fort Sill, FORSCOM, and the V Army, which hampered providing logistical support.[31]

Daily changing requirements further complicated logistical support. In one particular instance, General Schwarzkopf's staff called and said that it had an emergency requirement for a MLRS unit (B Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery) from Fort Sill. The installation transported the battery's equipment by rail to the Port of Houston for shipment to the Gulf. As this was occurring, Schwarzkopf's staff called again and said that the General wanted the battery in Southwest Asia as soon as possible. In response to this, Fort Sill personnel traveled to the port at Houston, unloaded two pieces of the battery's equipment from the ship, and transported it along with the rest of the battery's

[31]Ibid., p. 26.

equipment to Ellington Air Force Base, Texas, where a DOL Logistics Mobility Team coordinated loading it onto Air Force C-5As. In the meantime, Fort Sill assembled the crews and ammunition and sent them out on the same C-5As.[32]

[32]Memorandum for Command Historian, subj: Coordination of 1991 USAFACFS AHR, 13 Apr 92, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Hallada, 13 Mar 91, pp. 13-14, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Grady and Wong, 18 Jun 91, p. 26, HRDC.

Another example of the difficulties associated with Operation Desert Shield occurred when Fort Sill deployed a Lance unit. When the equipment arrived at the Port of Houston, those delivering it were told to return it to Fort Sill. At the last minute the Army had decided against shipping a Lance unit, which had nuclear capabilities, to Saudi Arabia because of political implications with the Soviet Union.[33]

To be sure, this and numerous other changes in shipping schedules forced the Directorate of Logistics to make quick adjustments. For example, one time a shipping date was unexpectedly moved up for a unit that was short a howitzer because it was waiting for spare parts to arrive. Since the unit could not wait for the spare parts, the directorate obtained a howitzer from the Gunnery Department in the Field Artillery School in the middle of the night, changed the bumper number on it, inspected it, and loaded it onto a rail car to fill the unit's requirement. One week later when the spare parts for the unit's howitzer came in, the directorate fixed the howitzer and issued it to the Gunnery Department as a replacement for the one that it had given up earlier.[34]

General Hallada pointed out that the above was the norm. Many times the Directorate of Logistics got behind repairing equipment because shipment dates were moved up overnight. Rather than having the initially anticipated time to repair a

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[33]Ibid., p. 18.

[34]Ibid., p. 26; Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Hallada, 13 Mar 91, pp. 13-14, HRDC.

piece of equipment, all of a sudden it had to be loaded for shipment earlier than planned, and the directorate had to go to incredible lengths to meet the new deadline.[35]

[35]Ibid.

To be sure, the deployment of materiel and personnel followed an unpredictable pattern and called for a high degree of flexibility and the ability to live with constant change.[36] On 2 April 1991 General Miller recalled, "As you well know, we were making up the TPFDL [Time Phase Force Deployment List] as we went. We sat . . . on the telephone with FORSCOM [U.S. Army Forces Command] almost nightly in that first week . . . to two weeks writing up the TPFDL, what was in III Corps Artillery, what should deploy, and when would it be ready to deploy. We had to figure out what was broken and then what could be reasonably . . . fixed prior to deployment."[37] He added, "There was no plan." Improvisation governed mobilization.[38] For example, units would receive notification that they would deploy by a certain date, and then that would often change, which meant accelerating preparations to meet the new deadline or waiting for some time after preparations had been completed. Besides affecting III Corps Artillery, improvisation influenced mobilizing Reserve Component units at Fort Sill. In an interview in March 1991 after the crisis, General Hallada mentioned:

As you know shortly after the start of Desert Shield we

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[36]Ibid., p. 13.

[37]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Miller, 2 Apr 91, p. 2, HRDC.

[38]Ibid., p. 6.

began . . . mobilizing National Guard and Reserve units. . . . We were alerted that we would begin to receive those units at Fort Sill for training . . . and the list was a very dynamic list. It was constantly changing. It was based on the Time Phase Force Deployment List, and that changed from day to day.[39]

[39]Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Hallada, 13 Mar 91, p. 5, HRDC.

If anything, uncertainty characterized the deployment of III Corps Artillery units and the mobilization of Reserve Component units and individuals. As General Miller clearly pointed out concerning III Corps Artillery, which also reflected the situation at Fort Sill as a whole according to General Hallada, supporting Operation Desert Shield involved contending "with the unknown and the unexpected" and reacting quickly and professionally to meet constantly changing requirements.[40] As a result, at no one time could Fort Sill accurately project future demands because it deployed for war without "any organized plan for mobilization and deployment that it had ever put together."[41]

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[40]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Miller, 2 Apr 91, p. 6, HRDC.

[41]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Grady and Wong, 18 Jun 91, p. 2, HRDC.

Fort Sill had mobilization plans, but actions emanating from CENTCOM preempted them. Based on procedures that had changed little since World War II, deploying a force to a theater of operations should have progressed according to a detailed Time Phased Force Development List that stated the order in which units and their equipment would be deployed. Two major factors stood in the way of such an orderly deployment during Operation Desert Shield. First, the American army had never projected such a huge force over such a long distance before, and it had little precedent to draw upon. Even though INTERNAL LOOK 90, an exercise in July 1990 that postulated an Iraqi attack with six heavy divisions into Saudi Arabia, and Operations Plan 1002-90 that had been rewritten in 1989 and 1990 from a Soviet invasion of Iran to an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia served as conceptual models for Operation Desert Storm, Central Command still had to hammer out most of the deployment details through ad hoc decision making and improvisation.[42]

Second, General Schwarzkopf's demand for a historically unprecedented rapid buildup to get as much combat power into the region as quickly as possible to defend Saudi Arabia also mitigated against an orderly deployment. Central Command simply did not have the luxury of time to plan out everything logically and establish clear priorities. As a result, Fort Sill and other Army installations often had to furnish support at a moment's notice, had to delay deploying a unit, or had to

[42]Scales, et al, Certain Victory, pp. 43, 48, 53, 60, 62, 69, 97-98, 377.

modify priorities as requirements changed, which happened frequently.[43]

[43]Ibid.; US News and World Report, Triumph without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Random House, 1992), p. 42.

While constantly changing requirements forced repeated adaptations, receiving the equipment shipped from Fort Sill in proper order in the Persian Gulf taxed the patience of III Corps Artillery units being sent to Southwest Asia. Fort Sill might have maintained the integrity of a unit's equipment that was frequently packed in containers when it loaded railcars, but once the cars left the installation, the carriers switched the containers and equipment around and generally broke unit integrity in Dallas, Texas, or Houston, before the equipment ever arrived at the port. Because of the method of loading the ships, unit integrity was further disrupted at the port to maximize the use of a ship. Port personnel sorted the unit's equipment in rows by size and cube and tried as best that they could to ship unit equipment together. However, when a certain size piece of equipment was needed to fill space on the ship and when there was none left in the unit's row, port personnel went to the next unit's row and sent the equipment to be loaded.[44]

Also, faced with increased requirements, pressure of time, and insufficient personnel, shippers often provided minimal documentation that transportation regulations allowed. As might be expected, this further aggravated the difficulty of maintaining unit equipment integrity. Locating items packed in crates or containers in many cases became almost impossible without the proper documentation that showed the contents.[45]

Colonel Banks of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade provided interesting insights into the problems associated with breaking up the integrity of the unit's equipment. "When the equipment came [arrived in the Persian Gulf]," he said,

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[44]Memorandum for Command Historian, subj: Coordination of 1991 USAFACFS AHR, 13 Apr 92, HRDC.

[45]Scales, et al, Certain Victory, p. 75.

"we had equipment spread across eight ships -- I am not sure if that is the right number." Colonel Banks continued, "You [would] get in a ship today and get part of [the unit's equipment]. The day after tomorrow, you [would] get in another ship. . . . Three days later you [would] get another ship in. Five days later you [would] get in another ship."[46] Because of this, the 212th Field Artillery Brigade as well as other Fort Sill units consumed valuable time after arriving in the Persian Gulf waiting for their equipment and then sorting it before deploying into the desert.[47]

In March 1991 General Hallada echoed Colonel Banks's frustration with shipping practices. General Hallada explained:

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[46]Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Hallada, 13 Mar 91, p. 9, HRDC.

[47]Ibid.

What happened is that a battalion's set of equipment could be loaded on three different ships. One ship would make it over there very quickly. One ship would be very slow, and another would go in and out of port three times because it broke down. So, equipment was arriving in country as much as a month and a half apart -- and not in any specific order.[48]

Such ship loading practices negated the effort by Fort Sill, broke up the smooth flow of equipment, and reflected the turbulence that existed at the ports of debarkation in the United States.[49]

For the most part, shipping equipment and personnel did not run concurrently. Because the former went by rail and then by ship, Fort Sill sent it first and then dispatched personnel as air transportation became available. Often, several weeks separated the two. This situation left

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[48]Ibid, p. 9.

[49]Ibid.; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Banks, 19 Jun 91, pp. 5-6, HRDC.

commanders with soldiers but with no equipment for meaningful training. To alleviate some of this problem, III Corps Artillery units borrowed some howitzers on a temporary basis from the Field Artillery Training Center at Fort Sill for training while they waited.[50]

[50]Memorandum to Cdr, U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center (USAFATC), subj: FATC Desert Shield/Storm After Action Review, 26 Jul 91, p. 10, HRDC.

Personnel shortages also afflicted deploying III Corps Artillery units. Addressing the seriousness of this, Colonel Banks explained that he did not have sufficient people when his unit received its alert notice on 17 August 1990 because peacetime policies had reduced his personnel strength far below that required for combat. By the time that the war had begun, however, the 212th Field Artillery Brigade had its proper personnel strength for combat.[51]

From Colonel Banks's viewpoint, an understrength unit posed a critical problem to readiness. Reflecting back, he commented in June 1991 that his unit was fortunate because it had time to assimilate the influx of new personnel. "Next time, I may not have that time and that luxury to integrate those people . . . to become part of the team," he lamented. Continuing, he added, "You can train with the equipment. . . . The one resource that makes the overall difference is the people." In other words, Colonel Banks found peacetime manning policies disruptive and potentially disastrous.[52]

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[51]Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Hallada, 13 Mar 92, p. 4, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Banks, 24 Jun 91, p. 28, HRDC.

[52]Ibid.

Bringing understrength III Corps Artillery units up to strength at least before they left Fort Sill meant pulling people from the installation's training mission and base operations. On 11 August 1990 the Commanding General, TRADOC, General John W. Foss, informed Fort Sill as well as other TRADOC installations that they could cross-level from TRADOC to the deploying units if there was no major impact on training or base operations until Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA) had issued personnel cross-leveling instructions. At the same time, he cautioned that TRADOC installations could not initiate action to obtain reservists being called up to replace Active Component soldiers being lost as fillers to deploying units. For the most part, General Foss was skeptical of employing reservists as replacements in TRADOC missions because they would be unfamiliar with the work and because this would limit the number of reservists available to the theater commander. Even with these considerations, he eventually relented when he decided to employ reservists in TRADOC missions on a limited case-by-case basis, but each one had to be approved by TRADOC before going to U.S. Army Personnel Command for action. Based upon General Foss's policy of early August 1990, cross-leveling ultimately meant creating shortages in the training base and base operations at Fort Sill because replacements would not be easily obtained for those soldiers in those areas being sent to fill spaces in deploying units.[53]

Although the potential for disrupting training was great in light of General Foss's policy, General Hallada took the initiative to ensure that III Corps Artillery units were

[53]Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp. 16-17, 44; JULLS Long Report, 27 Jun 91, HRDC; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to AIG 7432, subj: Personnel Fill Requests for Operation Desert Shield, 112115Z Aug 90, MSTL.

deploying at full strength to meet guidance issued by the Army Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Vuono. To do this, Fort Sill identified personnel in the training mission and base operations and put them on local orders that assigned them to a III Corps Artillery unit.[54]

[54]JULLS Long Report, 27 Jun 91, HRDC; Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p. 44.

Realizing that leaving such discretion to the local commander to fill the deploying units was unsuitable, the U.S. Army Total Army Personnel Center outlined personnel fill priorities on 13 August 1990 to standardize them throughout the Army. Because of the urgency of the situation, General Vuono decided that deploying combat units had to be properly manned by being at one hundred percent strength. In view of this, major commands had to furnish soldiers to deploying units as fillers even if this caused shortages in those units not deploying and hindered training or base operations because Operation Desert Shield had priority over any other Army activities.[55]

Upon receiving this instruction, Fort Sill's Adjutant General continued looking to the training base and base operations as sources of filler personnel. The Adjutant General readily moved personnel from the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery Training Center to III Corps Artillery units. To prevent diluting the training base at the center too much, the Commander of Field Artillery Training Center, Colonel Joseph Monko, and General Hallada ensured that it was only tapped for low-density MOSs. This left the Field Artillery School and base operations as the major sources of

[55]Ibid.; Memorandum to Cdr, USAFATC, subj: FATC Desert Shield/Storm After Action Review, 26 Jul 91, p. 9, HRDC.

people.[56]

[56]Ibid.; Memorandum for DPTM, subj: Field Artillery School (FAS) Support of Desert Shield/Storm, undated, HRDC.

After 23 August 1990 shifting personnel from the training mission and base operations to deploying units assumed greater significance. On that date General Foss announced that the people being lost from TRADOC resources would not be replaced by Reserve Component personnel called up to active duty. All TRADOC missions -- training and base operations -- would be accomplished within existing assets to preserve the two hundred thousand call-up of reserve personnel for the warfighting commander in chief. Ultimately, this meant that help would not be available from reservists, that a shortage of active duty military personnel would exist at Fort Sill, and that it could even possibly get worse. For Fort Sill General Foss's position proved to be especially serious because the post was losing many soldiers to deploying III Corps Artillery units and had no way of replacing them. A hiring freeze in the Department of Defense further complicated the matter by preventing the installation from replacing departing soldiers with civilians.[57]

At the same time Fort Sill lost people when their Guard or Reserve unit was mobilized. Although it involved fewer numbers than did filling vacancies, this was the second wave of personnel being lost and further increased the work load for those remaining behind.[58]

Ironically, a system existed to relieve Fort Sill's personnel shortages. As initially developed in the wake of the Vietnam War, the Total Force Policy, which served as the cornerstone of the country's national defense strategy, outlined employing the reserve forces as the primary augmentation of the active force. When the President authorized activating the reserve forces on 22 August 1990, the Department of Defense planned to use them to meet Central

[57]JULLS Long Report, 27 Jun 91.

[58]1990 USAFACFS AHR, pp. 31-32.

Command's needs, to backfill positions in the United States and other theaters vacated by Active Component personnel deployed to Saudi Arabia, and to serve in essential continental United States-based missions. In short, reservists were being activated specifically for helping Fort Sill and other installations in the United States as well as in Southwest Asia.[59]

[59]Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp. 471-74.

Given his inclinations and priorities, General Foss disrupted the system by refusing to use reservists in TRADOC and simultaneously compounded the difficulties at Fort Sill and other TRADOC installations by insisting that the regular training program would not suffer. General Foss placed Fort Sill in a bind because it was losing instructors to deploying units and had no possibilities of replacing them, even though a means existed to do so, and had to continue providing regular training and Persian Gulf training and conducting base operations as though it was fully staffed.[60]

For example, the inability to use individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) and Reserve Component units to augment the dwindling military and civilian work force complicated the already critical situation in base operations. Early during Operation Desert Shield, the Directorate of Logistics requested using individual mobilization augmentees because they had been trained and were crucial to the directorate's operations during a mobilization, but TRADOC refused the request in keeping with General Foss's policy on using reservists. As a result, the directorate had to proceed with operations employing the existing work force even though many individual mobilization augmentees were volunteering their services.[61]

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[60]Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp. 44-45; Memorandum for DPTM, subj: FAS Support of Desert Shield/Storm, undated, HRDC.

[61]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Grady and Wong, 18 Jun 91, pp. 2-6, HRDC; Malone, TRADOC Support

to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp. 17-1.

As with base operations organizations, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School felt the impact of Operation Desert Shield. In response to the crisis, the School conducted and supported training of individuals and units, both Active and Reserve Components. This began almost immediately upon the notification of deployment of American forces. In general, this involved changes to training and course schedules and a dramatic increase in requests for assistance, which forced the School to adapt an innovative approach to its normal mission.[62]

Specifically, the Field Artillery School expanded its training mission beyond its normal load. To satisfy the demands for trained personnel in the Persian Gulf, for example, the School increased the number of classes. This was particularly true for MOSs 13E (Cannon Fire Direction Specialist), 13F (Fire Support Specialist), and 13M (MLRS Crewmember). At the outset of the crisis, the School was also inundated with telephone calls from Active Component units to provide refresher training on the latest techniques, procedures, and equipment and responded to these requests by sending mobile training teams. As the former Deputy Assistant Commandant and Assistant Commandant, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Colonel Marshall R. McRee, remembered, nuclear/chemical analysis training was in the most demand for two reasons.[63] First, soldiers had let those skills lapse and did not know how to do nuclear/chemical analysis. Some field artillery officers had not done such target analysis since

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[62]Memorandum for DPTM, subj: FAS Support for Desert Shield/Storm, undated, HRDC.

[63]Memorandum for DPTM, subj: DOTD Significant Activities in Support of Desert Shield/Storm, 7 Mar 91, in Memorandum for DPTM, subj: FAS Support of Desert Shield/Storm, undated, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup with former Deputy Assistant Commandant, USAFAS, AC, USAFAS, and Chief of Staff, USAFACFS, Col Marshall McRee, 22 Jul 92, p. 1, HRDC.

they had come out of the Field Artillery Officer Advance Course. Second, units that had deployed had a huge influx of people without any expertise. Because of the possibility of employing chemical weapons, field artillerymen had to have the requisite skills, and this demanded proper training.[64]

[64]Ibid., p. 10.

The School also dispatched mobile training teams to train units in gunnery and other field artillery subjects, to name just a few. Late in 1990, the Target Acquisition Department dispatched a mobile training team of three people to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, to train elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps in the operation and maintenance of the Meteorological Data System that was being fielded. Over a period of ten days early in December 1990, the team trained meteorological sections in the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division, and the 18th Field Artillery Brigade. Later that same month, the team went to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where it trained elements of the 196th Field Artillery Brigade of the Tennessee Army National Guard on the Meteorological Data System. Subsequently, the Director of the Target Acquisition Department, Colonel Stanley E. Griffith, led a mobile training team to Southwest Asia on a fact-finding mission for Firefinder Version Nine software training and survey training. On another occasion, the School sent a team of twenty-seven people under the Director of the Gunnery Department, Colonel Thomas R. Hogan, to train the direct support field artillery battalion of the 48th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Georgia Army National Guard, which was a roundout brigade for the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Altogether, the Field Artillery School sent seven mobile training teams to other installations to train 314 personnel and trained an additional 1,011 deploying soldiers at Fort Sill. These efforts were performed in addition to regular training missions.[65] As it noted after Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, the Field Artillery School did not

[65]Ibid., p. 2; Memorandum for Director, DOTD, subj: Operation Desert Shield/Storm, 7 Mar 91, in Memorandum for DPTM, subj: FAS support of Desert Shield/Storm, undated, HRDC; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: MDS Mobile Training Team to SW Asia, 17 Dec 90, in Memorandum for DPTM, subj: FAS Support of Desert Shield/Storm, undated, HRDC.

turn down "a single request for training assistance."[66]

All of this additional training taxed School personnel and required sacrifice. As the School recalled, instructors and staff personnel had "to go that extra mile to meet all missions."[67] In March 1991 the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) recorded its difficulties with supporting mobile training teams. The directorate was required to take personnel from its staff and send them to other departments as instructors and as members of the teams. This in turn forced the directorate's divisions to pick up the work of the departed person and took people away from their primary duties. While this was workable for short periods of time, it caused a loss in continuity and expertise for extended periods because the directorate had personnel doing tasks for which they were not trained and were not their normal duties. However, the Directorate of Training and Doctrine's situation was not unusual because every department in the Field Artillery School was experiencing shortages of personnel because of Operation Desert Shield. The Director of the Gunnery Department, Colonel Hogan, recounted in January 1991 that his department was gutted of instructors to support

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[66]Memorandum for Record, subj: USAFAS and Desert Storm, undated, HRDC.

[67]Ibid.

mobile training teams and to fill deploying units.[68]

[68]Oral History Interview, Dastrup with McRee, 22 Jul 92, pp. 4-6, HRDC; Memorandum for DPTM, subj: DOTD Significant Activities in Support of Desert Shield/Storm, undated, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Director, Gunnery Department, Col Thomas R. Hogan, 4 Jan 91, HRDC.

Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School felt the deployment for Operation Desert Shield in other ways. Besides losing instructors to deploying units and mobile training teams, academic departments in the School taught classes above the maximum capacity to handle the expanded student load, increased training to a six-day work week in December 1990 to speed up the training cycle, and canceled the annual Christmas break to ensure that trained personnel were available upon demand.[69]

Besides this, Operation Desert Shield also disrupted normal resident training support. For years III Corps Artillery had been the major provider of support to School training requirements. On any given day, the School used two battalions worth of personnel and equipment from III Corps Artillery. With the loss of many units from this organization to the Persian Gulf, particularly firing units, the School had to make significant alterations in the number and type of training shoots. For example, 155-mm. howitzer exercises were replaced by 105-mm. howitzer exercises provided by the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery, because of the loss of M109 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzers when III Corps Artillery units deployed. Reflecting upon the challenges presented by

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[69]Memorandum for Director, DOTD, subj: Operation Desert Shield/Storm, 7 Mar 91; Memorandum for DPTM, subj: DOTD Significant Activities in Support of Desert Shield/Storm, 7 Mar 91; Both are in Memorandum for DPTM, subj: FAS Support for Desert Shield/Storm, undated, HRDC.

this, General Hallada recounted, "We had to shift resources and continually adjust support for the School on various shoots and battery operations and exercises."[70]

[70]Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Hallada, 13 Mar 91, HRDC.

Equipment shortages also confronted the Field Artillery School. To make up for M109 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzers that left with III Corps Artillery, the Field Artillery School identified a requirement for twelve M109 howitzers for training. To resolve the shortage the School approached the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. However, the School soon located eleven M109s at Fort Hood, Texas, awaiting shipment to the National Training Center, obtained permission from FORSCOM to use them up to sixty days, and had them shipped to Fort Sill. In the meantime, an additional howitzer was sent from Fort Knox, Tennessee, to Fort Sill to give the Field Artillery School the required twelve howitzers. When the howitzers from Fort Hood arrived at Fort Sill, they proved to be unsafe for firing, and FORSCOM declared them "not mission capable." Preliminary estimates of the time and costs to repair the howitzers ranged from forty-five to sixty days and $700,000 to $800,000 and thus encouraged the Field Artillery School to look at other places for M109s.[71]

[71]Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p. 50.

When the Commander of the Marine Corps Detachment at the Field Artillery School, Colonel Kent O. Steen, became aware of the need for the self-propelled howitzers for training, he volunteered to see if he could come up with some from Marine Corps resources. Knowing that the Corps was phasing out the M109, Colonel Steen made a couple of telephone calls and found the existence of a surplus of howitzers. Equally important, he learned that no one in the Marine Corps opposed giving them to the Army. Within five or six weeks after the initial telephone calls had been made in October 1990 and after extensive coordination between the Marine Corps and the Army, the Field Artillery School had twelve M109 self-propelled howitzers from the U.S. Marine Corps to replace those lost when III Corps Artillery deployed.[72]

Meanwhile, the rest of Fort Sill experienced the impact of training more soldiers. The requirement to train III Corps Artillery units increased the load on the small arms range and the NBC School. To handle this, the Field Artillery Training Center used the III Corps Artillery G-3 as the single point of contact for all of the Corps's training requirements to permit integrating its training requirements around initial entry

[72]Memorandum for Record, subj: USAFAS and Desert Storm, undated, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Cdr, U.S. Marine Corps Detachment, USAFAS, Col Kent O. Steen, 28 Aug 92, pp. 5-6, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup with McRee, 22 Jul 92, p. 3, HRDC; Memorandum for Chief of Staff, subj: AHR, 1 Feb 91, HRDC.

training. In fact, the ranges and NBC School were being used almost twenty-four hours a day to support the Field Artillery School, the Field Artillery Training Center, and Operation Desert Storm during the latter months of 1990.[73]

[73]Memorandum to Cdr, USAFATC, subj: FATC Desert Shield/Storm After Action Review, 26 Jul 91, pp. 7-8, HRDC.

As much as Operation Desert Shield tried Fort Sill soldiers and civilian employees, it simultaneously tested the ability of the Total Army that was composed of active and reserve soldiers and their families. For the Army dealing with families members on the scale that it did during the crisis was a new experience. Until the advent of the all-volunteer force in the 1970s, which was created in response to the Vietnam War, caring for spouses and dependents had been minimal. Afterwards, married soldiers with families to consider increased in numbers. By 1990 approximately fifty-three percent of the Army was married, while fifty-two thousand soldiers were married to other soldiers. As expected, when the soldiers went to war, spouses and families were left behind and had to deal with the unknown. Nine thousand military couples were deployed to the Gulf, and almost three thousand of them had children. Equally important, sixteen thousand of the Army's forty-five thousand single parents were sent. This gave the Army enormous family responsibilities that it had never had before.[74]

As the deployment of units unfolded, III Corps Artillery headquarters keenly felt the demographics of an all-volunteer force. It gradually assumed the mission of providing family support to complement its mission of warfighting. By the time that the deployment of the tactical units had been completed, III Corps Artillery headquarters's mission had changed from war fighting to family support. Left behind were over three thousand family members, who moved in and out of the Fort Sill-Lawton community based upon what was best for them. For example, General Miller recalled, "We had units that were

[74]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Miller, 2 Apr 91, pp. 11-12, HRDC; JULLS Long Report, 27 Jun 91, HRDC; Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p. 69; Scales, et al, Certain Victory, p. 54.

scheduled to deploy on one day and then did not leave for a week and a half. Families went through great expense in getting their soldier ready to go to war, and then that soldier did not leave for a month."[75] The uncertainty of the deployment schedule, needless to say, strained families emotionally.[76]

[75]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Miller, 2 Apr 91, pp. 8, 12, HRDC.

[76]Ibid., pp. 11-12.

To assist the families and soldiers with various needs and to minimize the emotional strain caused by the deployments, the Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities created a Desert Shield Operations Center that operated twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week and opened a Family Support Center to provide information for family members of deployed soldiers. Beyond the standard function of message handling and readiness reporting, the directorate furnished on-call assistance and briefings of all kinds to approximately three thousand soldiers and family members, developed an information book on Saudi Arabia, helped family members send messages to Saudi Arabia, organized a loan closet for forty-three reservists, and held a Family Support Day Picnic in the Caisson Activity Center. The directorate also expanded the hours of operation at the Army Community Center that operated the Family Assistance Center, Rinehart Fitness Center, Caisson Activity Center, Gunners' Inn Club, and post movie theater. The directorate also established a comprehensive Family Support Group network at battalion and higher with newsletters, weekly meetings, and morale boosting social and informational events, such as letter-writing, adopt-a-unit, and care package campaigns.[77]

As the diverse activities that ranged from taking care of families left behind to deploying personnel and equipment suggested, supporting Operation Desert Shield required sacrifice. Every organization on Fort Sill felt the impact through longer working hours and fewer people and did their best to ensure that deploying units were properly equipped and manned. Although supporting the deploying units occupied most

[77]Memorandum for Command Historian's Office with Encl, subj: AHR, 31 Jan 92, HRDC.

of the time, Fort Sill certainly did not neglect the families of the departing soldiers by developing various programs to make the separation less burdensome and challenging.

CHAPTER III

MOBILIZING THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

As it carried out the tremendous task of deploying III Corps Artillery units, Fort Sill simultaneously served as a mobilization station for Army Reserve and Army National Guard units, collectively known as Army Reserve Component forces, being activated. In view of the extent and seriousness of the crisis in Southwest Asia, President George Bush exercised his prerogatives under Title 10, Section 673b of the U.S. Code on 22 August 1990 when he signed Executive Order 12727. This authorized the Secretary of Defense to call up units and individuals of the Selected Reserve to active duty. At the same time Title 10 divided mobilization into three stages: an involuntary contingency call-up of a maximum of two hundred thousand members of the Selected Reserve for an initial period of ninety days with the possible extension of ninety days; partial mobilization that involved a presidential declaration of an emergency and that allowed a call-up of one million reservists; and full mobilization that permitted activating the existing approved force structure.[1]

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[1]Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 37; Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp. 14, 18; John Romjue, Susan Canedy, and Anne W. Chapman, Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army

Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1993 (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), pp. 125-29; U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter, Feb 91, p. v, HRDC.

As organized in 1990, the Selected Reserve formed only a portion of the United States' military reserves that were available for mobilization. Together, the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve comprised the country's reserve forces with the Ready Reserve being the first to be activated because it was the most highly trained of the three. The Ready Reserve, moreover, was subdivided into the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the Inactive National Guard, and the Selected Reserve. Consisting of troop program units, individual mobilization augmentees (IMA), and active Guard Reserves, who were designated by their respective services and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being essential to initial wartime missions, the Selected Reserve was first to be mobilized from the Ready Reserve. Although they were not part of the Selected Reserves, IRR soldiers were trained individuals, who had served in the Active Component or Selected Reserve and had some military service obligation remaining. As a result, they were subject to activation during a partial mobilization if required.[2]

[2]Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 472; Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare the Army for War, p. 128; Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p. 18.

Beginning in August 1990 and continuing into early 1991, the Pentagon mobilized the Selected Reserves in three different call-ups. As with the reserve forces from the other armed services of the United States, the first call-up for the Army's Reserve Components occurred on 24 August 1990. At that time the Department of the Army ordered combat service support units to active duty to flesh out the mobilization base and to support Active Component combat unit deployment because many of their services were not readily available in the active force. Besides stevedores, communications specialists, and medical technicians, the Army mobilized transportation, quartermaster, judge advocate general, and public affairs units, to name a few. After the President decided on 8 November 1990 to reinforce the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations for offensive operations, the Secretary of Defense expanded the Reserve Component's involvement with the second call-up. He authorized ordering reserve combat units onto active duty for as long as 180 days with an extension of another 180 days if necessary. From this point onwards, the Army mobilized five Army National Guard combat brigades and one Special Forces group. Three of the Army National Guard brigades were maneuver and two were field artillery -- the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade of the Arkansas Army National Guard with a battalion in Oklahoma and 196th Field Artillery Brigade of the Tennessee Army National Guard with battalions in Tennessee, Kentucky, and West Virginia.[3]

On 18 January 1991 the President authorized the third call-up. This action included mobilizing Selected Reserve units and IRR soldiers and simultaneously permitted the retention of all Reserve Component personnel on active duty for as long as one year. To be sure, the third call-up

[3]CALL Newsletter, Feb 91, p. v, HRDC; Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare the Army for War, pp. 127-28.

signaled an even greater commitment on the part of the United States to the integrity of Kuwait and to its own national interests in the Persian Gulf region because even more reservists were being mobilized for active military duty.[4]

[4]Scales, et al, Certain Victory, pp. 52-53; Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp. 474-76; CALL Newsletter, Feb 92, p. vi, HRDC; Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare the Army for War, pp. 127-28.

As a result of these activations, the Army Reserve Components provided a significant number of personnel. By 13 January 1991, three days before Operation Desert Storm began, the Army had mobilized almost 103,000 Selected Reservists. As of 24 February 1991, almost 140,000 reservists, including IRR soldiers, had been called up. Of these, forty-one thousand served in the theater of operations.[5]

By the time that Operation Desert Storm had ended, the mobilization and deployment of the Army's Reserve Components, the largest such action since the Korean War of the 1950s, represented the first serious test of the Army's Total Force Policy. Established in the wake of the Vietnam War in the 1970s, the Total Force Policy dictated using the Reserve Components as the primary augmentation of the active force by shifting combat support and combat service support critical for sustaining the Active Component into the Army National Guard and Army Reserves. By the late 1980s the Reserve Components had fifty-two percent of the combat forces and sixty-seven percent of the combat support and combat service support. Seven Reserve Component brigades -- six from the Army National Guard and one from the Army Reserve -- rounded out active divisions with ten separate battalions from the Army National Guard serving as roundouts to the Active Component. At the same time the Total Force Policy involved integrating active, reserve, and civilian forces into one

[5]Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp. 474-85.

synergistic force.[6]

[6]Ibid., p. 471; Scales, et al, Certain Victory, p. 18.

Fourteen TRADOC installations with Fort Sill being one of them served as mobilization stations for the Reserve Components. On 23 September 1990 the first reserve units -- the 1122nd Transportation Company of the Arkansas National Guard and the 2120th Combat Support Company of the Oklahoma National Guard -- arrived at Fort Sill for mobilization and deployment. Essentially, reception; medical; dental; supply; equipment issue; personnel cross-leveling if required; finance; and common task, weapons, and refresher training comprised mobilization activities.[7] By the time that 8 February 1991 when the final reserve unit was deployed had come, Fort Sill had mobilized thirty-two reserve units but had deployed only twenty because the war was so short and because the rest were not needed.[8]

Bringing Army National Guard and Army Reserve units onto active duty presented unique challenges. Upon being notified

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[7]Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Hallada, 13 Mar 91, p. 6, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Grady and Wong, pp. 7-8, HRDC; CALL Newsletter, Feb 92, pp. vi-vii, HRDC.

[8]Memorandum for Cdr, USACATA, subj: AAR for Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Desert Shield/Storm Operations with AG, 1 Mar 91, HRDC.

that it would be a mobilization station, Fort Sill quickly established contact with those units assigned to come to the post for activation, created information packages about the installation, and requested information about the unit's support requirements. As other U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) mobilization sites learned, Fort Sill also found out that reserve units appeared in less than full readiness because of equipment shortages or deficiencies, insufficient training, or personnel shortages.[9]

Upon examining Reserve Components' equipment, Fort Sill often found much of it to be at a C-3 or C-4 level that made the unit unable to be deployed. These ratings came as a shock to reserve units because they had consistently rated their equipment as C-1 or C-2, which meant that it was deployable. Besides forcing the Directorate of Logistics at Fort Sill to work on the equipment to bring it up to deployable standards, the low ratings simultaneously upset higher Army National Guard or Army Reserve headquarters because they did not think that the low ratings were justified. For example, the V Army commander indignantly challenged the low ratings. After learning that the ratings were fair and based upon the actual condition of the

[9]Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p. 20; Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Hallada, 13 Mar 91, pp. 5-7, HRDC.

equipment and that it was being brought up to deployable standards, he applauded the Directorate of Logistics for its action and candor. He understood that equipment that was in good condition meant better performance and fewer maintenance problems in combat.[10]

In some cases Army Reserve and Army National Guard equipment had to be exchanged. For example, the unit status report of the 1122nd Transportation Company, a 5-ton truck company, showed a C-2 rating based on substituting fifty-four 2 1/2 ton trucks for 5-ton trucks, which was permitted under National Guard Bureau regulations. Because Fort Sill had to deploy the unit as a 5-ton truck company, it had to replace the 2 1/2 ton trucks with 5-ton trucks. The installation trained unit personnel to drive 5-ton trucks, located 5-ton trucks in Ohio, and sent the drivers there to pick up the

[10]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Grady and Wong, 18 Jun 91, pp. 2, 21, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Hallada, 13 Mar 91, pp. 5-6, HRDC.

trucks and drive them back to Fort Sill. Besides being expensive, exchanging the trucks caused unnecessary delays and unusual requisition procedures to bring the unit up to its validation standards so that it could be deployed.[11]

As the Director of the Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization (DPTM), Colonel James R. Russell, reported after Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the controversy between Fort Sill and the Reserve Components over ratings and the proper equipment stemmed from different unit readiness reporting standards. The Active Component completed readiness reporting under Army Regulation (AR)

[11]Memorandum for Cdr, USACATA, subj: AAR for Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Grady and Wong, 18 Jun 91, p. 2, HRDC; JULLS Long Report, 22 Jul 91, p. 27, HRDC.

220-1. It allowed all regular army units to report readiness status using a common measuring tool to make comparisons between similar units possible. In contrast, the Army National Guard utilized National Guard Bureau Regulation 525-10, which employed different criteria for reporting readiness.

As a result, when Guard units reported to Fort Sill, they said that their equipment was ready for deployment and honestly believed that it was based upon their regulations, while Fort Sill's Directorate of Logistics thought otherwise because it applied a totally different measurement standard. To eliminate such discrepancies, which had the potential of causing serious problems in a future mobilization and wasted time because the directorate had to figure out exactly what equipment was needed, Fort Sill suggested requiring all Reserve Component units to be obligated to report their readiness in accordance with AR 220-1. This would establish a common standard for Active as well as Reserve Component forces and eliminate confusion and disagreements over readiness ratings.[12]

As might be expected, problems with Reserve Components' equipment extended beyond the C-ratings. Many reserve representatives arrived at the Reserve Component Reception Center at Fort Sill without the proper documents and familiarity with processing requirements. In fact, they were

[12]JULLS Long Report, 22 Jul 91, p. 8, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, USACATA, subj: AAR for Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, p. 5, HRDC.

not trained nor knowledgeable in the preparation of Department of the Army (DA) Form 2406, Equipment Status Report; DA Form 2715, Unit Status Report; and other critical forms. This caused unnecessary delays with in-processing and requesting unit equipment and led to the recommendation by Fort Sill that all personnel involved with in-processing be trained and have the proper documents upon arrival.[13] Beside this, many Reserve Component units came to Fort Sill without the "things they needed for day-to-day operations."[14] In response, Fort Sill had to contract with local businesses for the required items to make the unit deployable.[15]

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[13]JULLS Long Report, 22 Jul 91, p. 13, HRDC.

[14]Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Hallada, 13 Mar 91, p. 6, HRDC.

[15]Ibid.

Bringing the Reserve Components up to deployable standards also often involved additional training in many instances. Although the Field Artillery School provided training for Reserve Component personnel in certain Military Occupational Skills (MOS) as a part of mobilization, it came at a high cost. In July 1992 Colonel Marshall McRee, who was the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School during the crisis, vividly recalled, "We had the people to train the load [the regular training load] we had, but we did not have the means to take these other people [reservists] and train them."[16] The School simply did not have sufficient numbers of people in the instructor base or mobilization Tables of Distribution and Allowance to pick up the additional training load created by the reserves. Early on, the School looked to the U.S. Army Reserve Forces School for relief but found that it did not teach combat MOSs because the Reserve Components had so few combat arms units and, therefore, did not have a need for such training. This situation forced the School to continue employing its existing but dwindling instructor base to train Active as well as Reserve Component personnel.[17]

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[16]Oral History Interview, Dastrup with McRee, 22 Jul 92, p. 4, HRDC.

[17]Ibid., pp. 4-6; Memorandum for Cdr, USACATA, subj: AAR for Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Hallada, 13 Mar 91, p. 6, HRDC; Oral

History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Grady and Wong, 18 Jun 91, pp. 7-8, HRDC; CALL Newsletter, Feb 92, pp. vi-vii, HRDC.

At the same time some Reserve Component units could have been better trained at their home station. In addition to improving readiness, it would have lightened the training load on Fort Sill. For example, the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade, which III Corps Artillery assisted in deployment preparation, arrived at Fort Sill with an overly optimistic report about its unit training readiness. Unfortunately, much of the fundamental staff training that should have been done at home had not been completed. When it became apparent that the brigade had not taken advantage of the warning order issued by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the forty-five days to accomplish fundamental staff training, III Corps Artillery had to adjust its training resources and objectives to eliminate the deficiency, but fielding the Light Tactical Fire Direction System (Light TACFIRE) so that the brigade would have automated command, control, and communications became the overriding consideration at the expense of staff training.[18]

Although Active as well as Reserve Component units were unprepared for movement to Southwest Asia, the latter's state of training readiness for actual mobilization frequently made the transition from a reserve to an active status difficult. For the most part, a reserve unit conducted its annual training unilaterally even though its mobilization plans called for working with Fort Sill. Generally, a field artillery unit would show up at Fort Sill for its annual training, fire its weapons, and then go home after two weeks of training. For gun crews this furnished satisfactory training. However valuable this training was, it failed to provide opportunities for the units to work with Fort Sill agencies that were responsible for preparing them for

[18]JULLS Long Report, 22 Jul 91, pp. 6, 13, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, USACATA, subj: AAR for Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, HRDC.

mobilization and deployment. From the installation's perspective, reserve units had to train with Fort Sill to ensure a smooth activation. Annual training had to be handled as if the unit were actually mobilizing. Specifically, each unit had to go through the Reserve Component Reception Center upon arrival at Fort Sill not only to test the post staff in this critical function but also to identify the shortcomings of the unit in critical areas such as training, maintenance, supply, unit movement planning, rail loading, and preparation for overseas movement.[19]

[19]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Grady and Wong, 18 Jun 91, pp. 12-13, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, USACATA, subj: AAR for Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, HRDC.

Discrepancies found in mobilization training support requirements given to Fort Sill also caused problems. In some cases, reserve units furnished Fort Sill with inadequate support requirements. The Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization wrote that Post Mobilization Training Support Requirements provided by most reserve units were worthless except as a marginally current unit address source. Range requirements, billeting, transportation, dental examinations, medical examinations, and other support requirements were inaccurate and outdated because they had been reviewed too long ago. For the support requirement document to be valuable, it had to be accurate and had to be completed recently. Notwithstanding these problems, Fort Sill provided training, medical, dental, equipment, and financial support and personnel cross-leveling for Reserve Component units before declaring them ready for deployment.[20]

Besides validating a Reserve Component's equipment and state of training, Fort Sill checked personnel to determine their deployability. When Reserve or Guard units came without sufficient personnel, Fort Sill found people to fill the vacancies. Some came from the Active Component, and some came from other Army National Guard or Army Reserve units.[21]

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[20]Ibid., pp. 2, 5; JULLS Long Report, 22 Jul 91, p. 3, HRDC.

[21]1990 USAFACFS AHR, p. 33.

Equally as critical, a soldier's physical fitness determined the individual's deployability and simultaneously influenced unit readiness. Often a medical examination indicated a physical reason, such as an illness, a dental problem, or excess weight, that precluded deploying a soldier, which in turn created a vacancy that had to be filled. Some units even showed up at Fort Sill with pregnant women that could not be deployed. Moreover, the Deputy Commander, Clinical Services, Reynolds Army Community Hospital, Colonel (Dr.) Charles R. Kuhn, recalled that some reservists from the 44th Medical Evacuation Hospital, based in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and El Paso, Texas, "were absolute walking medical encyclopedias that should have never been in the reserves. . . . Some of these people could hardly walk from their car to the back door to come to work much less deploy."[22]

Notwithstanding this extreme example, most reservists met the physical fitness standards to be medically deployable, but Reynolds officials still cautioned that medical readiness of the units could have been much better than it was. Ultimately, poor medical readiness could cause personnel shortages beyond those already created by normal peacetime manning policies. A unit could show up for mobilization and find out much to its dismay that it had more personnel

[22]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Kuhn and Fumbanks, 18 Jul 91, pp. 15-16, HRDC.

vacancies to fill than anticipated because of medical reasons if it was not careful.[23]

[23]Ibid., p. 25.

Although the state of personnel, equipment, and training readiness varied from unit to unit, Reserve Component units, nevertheless, shared one common perspective before arriving at Fort Sill. They expected to be treated differently by Fort Sill people than their active duty cousins. Every unit, active or reserve, was inspected and certified as being ready not on their own word but on an objective assessment of their people and equipment by Fort Sill representatives. The installation made no distinction between the Active and Reserve Components, treated both the same, and worked hard to ensure that all units had all of their required equipment and personnel with the latter being qualified on their weapons, trained in nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare, and capable of performing their missions before being deployed.[24] Reflecting upon the installation's support for the reserves, the Commanding General, III Corps Artillery, Brigadier General (later Major General) Frank L. Miller, Jr., pointed out that they lived in his billets, used his motor pools, and ate his food just as though they were his own soldiers.[25]

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[24]Memorandum for Cdr, USACATA, subj: AAR for Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, HRDC.

[25]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with

Miller, 2 Apr 91, pp. 17, 19, HRDC.

In the wake of partial mobilization that began on 18 January 1991, the Army started activating soldiers from the Individual Ready Reserve. The availability of IRR soldiers was particularly critical at this point in the crisis. During Operation Desert Shield, reserve units earmarked for call-up experienced many difficulties with one of them being personnel shortages. In some cases, combat support and combat service support reserve units had been organized at less than wartime strength requirements. Others were manned at less than peacetime approved operating levels, while some units contained personnel who were not deployable. To fill out these units, the Army cross-leveled personnel voluntarily and involuntarily from units not scheduled for activation or deployment at the moment. Although this practice satisfied the immediate requirement for personnel, it reduced the readiness of units that were left behind and that might be activated or deployed later. Earlier activation of IRR soldiers would have given Reserve as well as Active Component units access to personnel to fill shortages without hurting other units. Nonetheless, the availability of IRR soldiers beginning late in January 1991 meant that units depleted of personnel from cross-leveling efforts could now fill their shortages and be fully staffed.[26]

Directed to report to active duty by 31 January 1991, IRR soldiers, however, did not train regularly with the Active Component, were not on any kind of regular pay status, and, therefore, presented unique mobilization challenges. They were individuals, who had left the active service for a number of reasons and were eligible for call-up under partial mobilization. About forty percent of the IRR soldiers were

[26]Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare the Army for War, p. 129; JULLS Long Report, 27 Jun 91, HRDC; Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp. 25, 26, 59; Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp. 476-77.

RT-12 soldiers, who had not completed their eight-year service obligation required by law and had served in a troop program unit, active or reserve, within the last twelve months. For example, a soldier, who had served four years on active duty, still had a four-year reserve obligation that could be completed with a regular reserve unit or in the Individual Ready Reserve. The other group of IRR soldiers consisted of personnel, who had completed their mandatory service obligation and had elected to continue voluntarily as members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Of particular interest were IRR soldiers with MOSs in short supply or RT-12 soldiers.[27]

[27]Ibid.; Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare the Army for War, p. 129; JULLS Long Report, 27 Jun 91, HRDC; Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp. 25, 26, 59.

Although the Army's existing mobilization plans only required IRR soldiers to be sent to continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Centers to draw uniforms and equipment, to zero personal weapons, and to fit protective masks, they did not provide for refresher training in either common or MOS skills. Interestingly, of the Army's three hundred thousand IRR soldiers, only ten thousand received any annual peacetime training because it was voluntary. Moreover, even though some IRR soldiers had been out of the Army less than one year, they had training levels below the necessary proficiency.[28] In view of this and the Army Chief of Staff's and FORSCOM commander's directive that all IRR soldiers would be MOS certified, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) told its service schools to provide refresher training specifically designed for them. IRR soldiers would be sent first to the school with proponency for their MOS and then to FORSCOM, U.S. Army,
Europe (USAREUR), or a replacement center for processing to Southwest Asia.[29]

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[28]Ibid., pp. 27, 29; Memorandum for Cdr, FATC, subj: FATC Desert Shield/Storm AAR, 26 Jul 91, p. 2, HRDC.

[29]Ibid., pp. 2-3; Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p. 59.

Given the nature of the situation in Southwest Asia, the Army could never determine how many IRR soldiers that TRADOC would have to train and over what period of time. This situation left Fort Sill in a quandary. As the Field Artillery Training Center's (FATC)S-3 (operations) officer, Major David C. Cutler, recalled after the crisis in the Persian Gulf was over, schools and training centers were to provide refresher training in MOS skills and had to be prepared to form the 13Bs into replacement crews. However, the center never knew what skills had to be trained or how many soldiers would arrive. It received only vague guidance that was generally provided verbally to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Major General Raphael J. Hallada.[30]

Even so, the School and Center pressed forward to develop the appropriate training. Upon being notified by TRADOC in December 1990 about the possibility of IRR soldiers being sent to Fort Sill, General Hallada alerted the Center's commander, Colonel Joseph Monko. This generated concern that the Field Artillery Training Center would become heavily involved in IRR training to support Operation Desert Shield and any possible combat operations and would be unable to devote its attention to its initial entry training mission (Basic Combat Training

[30]Memorandum for Cdr, FATC, subj: FATC Desert Shield/Storm AAR, 26 Jul 91, pp. 2-3, 20, 24, HRDC.

and Advanced Individual Training).[31]

[31]Memorandum for Cdr, USACATA, subj: AAR for Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, FATC, subj: FATC Desert Shield/Storm AAR, 26 Jul 91, pp. 2, 5, 19-20, HRDC; "Reservists Hone Skills for Desert," Fort Sill Cannoneer, 24 Jan 91, p. 1a, HRDC.

For the center, the possibility of providing refresher training for IRR soldiers appeared to be overwhelming because two far-reaching decisions had already expanded its initial entry training load and had filled its training units to their maximum capacity since mid-1990. First, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command had recruited more people during the summer of 1990 than it had done in previous summers and continued to recruit heavily into August 1990, which extended the summer surge at the center into the fall of 1990. Recruiting Command habitually recruited more individuals than required during the summer and relied upon attrition at the reception stations to keep training loads within capacity. However, attrition in 1990 did not occur at the levels in the past. As a result, the summer surge had not shrunk by the time that it had reached the Field Artillery Training Center and continued into the fall of 1990.[32]

Also, a decision made by the Department of the Army in September 1990 promised to keep initial entry training at excessively high levels for an indefinite period of time. That month the Army directed TRADOC to expand its initial entry training numbers for the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1991 (October-December 1990) to meet the needs of possible hostilities in the Persian Gulf. This gave the Field Artillery Training Center a larger than normal initial entry training load in December 1990 that was coming on the heels of a larger and longer than usual summer surge and that was expected to remain unusually heavy early in 1991. As expected, the center feared that refresher training for IRR soldiers would tax its already overloaded training personnel (drill sergeants and cadre) and physical resources.

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[32]Ibid., p. 11; "Reservists Hone Skills for Desert," p. 1a; Memorandum for Cdr, USACATA, subj: AAR for Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, p. 2, HRDC.

Ultimately, this meant that the Center would be unable to train initial entry soldiers as effectively, nor could it conduct quality refresher training.[33]

[33]Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Storm, pp. 44-45; Memorandum for Cdr, FATC, subj: FATC Desert Shield/Storm AAR, 26 Jul 91, pp. 14, 19, HRDC.

Fortunately, Colonel Monko's apprehensions never materialized. Although the Field Artillery Training Center and the Field Artillery School did not have any programs of instruction specifically tailored for the IRR soldiers, the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) in the School coordinated and administered the entire development of IRR training. This required DOTD and the Field Artillery Training Center to produce new course programs of instruction (POI) and additional support requirements and to track student personnel daily to determine their deployability.[34] In Colonel McRee's (Assistant Commandant) words the School had to "cut and paste what POIs we had for the various MOSs to take care of the guys."[35]

Although the Field Artillery Training Center had assistance from the School in developing IRR training and sufficient people for its regular training load, it did not have enough instructors to furnish refresher training. To assist the regular instructor force, the center had to turn to the Reserve Components. Prompted by the first indication that IRR soldiers would be sent to Fort Sill, the center developed a training plan that called for mobilizing certain Reserve Component field artillery training units. In accordance with Army mobilization plans, two Reserve Component brigades had the mission of conducting field artillery training. The 402nd Brigade, 95th Training Division, Lawton, Oklahoma, would be detached from the 95th Training Division upon mobilization to help expand the Field Artillery Training Center. The 3rd Brigade, 84th Training Division, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, would be mobilized with the 84th Division and establish a training

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[34]Ibid., 1; Memorandum for DPTM, subj: DOTD Significant Activities in Support of Desert Shield/Storm, 7 Mar 91, p. 4, HRDC.

[35]Oral History Interview, Dastrup with McRee, 22 Jul 92, p. 4, HRDC.

center at Fort Hood, Texas, to conduct field artillery One-Station-Unit-Training.[36]

[36]Memorandum for Cdr, FATC, subj: FATC Desert Shield/Storm AAR, 26 Jul 91, pp. 5, 22-23, 30-31, HRDC.

Existing mobilization plans, however, did not prevent the Field Artillery Training Center from adapting them to suit its immediate requirements. After considering the strengths and weaknesses of each Reserve Component field artillery training unit and receiving Headquarters TRADOC concurrence, the center selected the 3rd Brigade and its three battalions for the artillery portion of training. They had experience instructing the entire MOS 13B program of instruction and were deemed proficient, whereas the 402nd Brigade had only taught basic combat training and had a significant number of its cadre not MOS qualified. Because the 3rd Brigade had to cross-level personnel to fill the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 334th Field Artillery, it could furnish only two of the three required battalions. In light of this, the Field Artillery Training Center turned to the 4th Battalion, 89th Field Artillery, 402nd Brigade, Fort Worth, Texas, to be the third battalion. When Fort Sill's portion of the IRR refresher training was reduced on 21 January 1991, the Army dropped the battalion from the alert list for activation. As a result, it was never called up. In the meantime, the center selected the 402nd Training Support Battalion, 402nd Brigade, to conduct common skills training.[37]

[37]Ibid.

After the President had declared a partial mobilization on 18 January 1991, the Army started calling Reserve Component training units to active duty three days later. During the last week of January 1991, the 402nd Training Support Battalion and the 3rd Brigade began arriving at Fort Sill at almost the same time that the first IRR soldiers began reporting in. Along with 402nd Reception Battalion from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and the 402nd Training Group, the above units, which were integrated into the Field Artillery Training Center, and the Field Artillery School trained over three thousand IRR soldiers over a period of about one month, while center units provided initial entry training. For the most part, this arrangement worked well and prevented the Center from carrying the burden of furnishing initial entry training as well as refresher training.[38]

[38]Ibid., pp. 5, 34; Oral History Interview, Dastrup with McRee, 22 Jul 92, p. 5, HRDC; Malone, TRADOC Support for Operations Desert Shield and Storm, p. 59.

The Field Artillery Training Center sent IRR soldiers through a five-element training plan. Upon arriving at Fort Sill, the soldier underwent diagnostic testing (the first element) to determine training level and identify soldiers, who might be used as section chiefs, gunners, or peer instructors. After this, the soldier received opportunity training (second element) in tasks that could be taught without training aids and could be started while the person was still in-processing. Core task (third element) training followed where the soldier was provided the foundation necessary to join the unit of assignment. Next came Evaluation/Certification (fourth element). At this time the center evaluated all soldiers on all of the core subjects. When the soldier completed training to the standard on all of the tasks on the individual training record, the individual was considered qualified. Last, the soldier received follow-on/continued training (fifth element). Based upon the assumption that there would be time between when the soldier was certified trained and when the individual left for the unit of assignment, the Center decided to furnish training until the time that the soldier had actually departed. Refresher training was battle focused and hands-on rather than absorption and task oriented. Equally important, it was individually paced so that the soldier moved on to the next training event after demonstrating the ability to perform a certain task. Ultimately, the bulk of the training was intended to sharpen MOS skills with the rest honing skills common to every soldier.[39]

On 31 January 1991 the ten-day refresher training cycles began for IRR soldiers and continued through early March 1991 with MOSs being taught by the Field Artillery School starting

[39]Memorandum for Cdr, FATC, subj: FATC Desert Shield/Storm AAR, 26 Jul 91, pp. 4, 19-22, 33, Annex C, HRDC; "Reservists Hone Skills for Desert," p. 1a.

first because they were longer. In-processing through the preparation for overseas movement and initial issue formed a critical portion of the training program so that there would be no delays for administrative reasons and was the first day of training. Day two included diagnostic training and more processing for overseas movement. Completion of processing for overseas movement occurred in day three. During day four, the soldiers received nuclear, biological, and chemical training. On day five the soldiers underwent basic rifle marksmanship and qualification on a twenty-five meter range. Day six was the first day of MOS peculiar training, while days seven and eight consisted of more task refresher training and crew drill, commonly known as cannoneers' hop. On day nine soldiers underwent reconnaissance, selection and occupation of position, and dry fire training in the field and experienced a small field training exercise on day ten. On day eleven MOS 13B soldiers were ready to be shipped to their assignment, whereas the other Field Artillery MOSs were ready when the Field Artillery School had completed their refresher training.[40]

[40]Memorandum for Cdr, FATC, subj: FATC Desert Shield/Storm AAR, 26 Jul 91, pp. 5, 40, 42-43, HRDC.

The Field Artillery Training Center also decided to treat IRR soldiers differently than initial entry trainees. Because the former had already given honorable service to their country, because they had not volunteered to come back into uniform, and because their lives were being disrupted with some of them being college students, who had just registered for the spring semester, they were treated with the dignity and respect that they deserved as experienced soldiers. Likewise, the center opted to modify the degree of control. IRR soldiers had unlimited pass privileges once they had completed in-processing, while all efforts by the center focused on what Colonel Monko termed the "feel good factor." Training would cause the soldiers to feel good about themselves, their service to their country and Army, their training, and their abilities to do their job and survive on the battlefield.[41]

Although IRR soldiers understood the necessity of their calls to active duty and had positive attitudes, they were still not thrilled about being back in uniform. One soldier's comments, perhaps, reflected the feelings of the majority when he said, "At first I felt like crying, but I'm here, ready to train, ready to go to Saudi Arabia if needed -- but ready to get it over with and get back to my family and school."[42]

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[41]Ibid., pp. 33-34.

[42]Ibid., p. 35.

IRR soldiers might not have wanted to be back in uniform, but they adapted unexpectedly rapidly to their return to Army life. As the Field Artillery Training Center noted, their quick adjustment was an intangible "which had never been measured and FATC was prepared for the worst."[43] This underscored the wisdom in treating IRR soldiers differently than initial entry training soldiers.[44]

Mobilizing the Reserve Components at Fort Sill involved working with two distinct groups of soldiers that had their own requirements. On one hand, Fort Sill helped reserve units make the transition from a reserve to an active status. On the other hand, the installation brought IRR soldiers onto active duty. Interestingly, the Field Artillery School, which participated in training both groups, and the Field Artillery Training Center, which trained only IRR soldiers, had the capabilities of expanding their instructor base to meet the increased load based upon mobilization plans. In the case of the School, attempts to obtain individual mobilization augmentees, which were a vital part of its mobilization Tables of Distribution and Allowances, and assistance from the U.S. Army Reserve Forces School fell short. While the Reserve Forces School lacked personnel with the requisite qualifications to train combat arms skills, especially field artillery, General Foss prevented the Field Artillery School from using individual mobilization augmentees and other reserve personnel when he decided that TRADOC would accomplish its mission without assistance from the two hundred thousand call-up. This forced reliance upon a shrinking instructor base to train mobilizing reserve units and IRR soldiers and overloaded the School's academic departments that were already being stressed to meet the increased training demands levied

[43]Ibid., p. 36.

[44]Ibid.

by Active Component units. Fortunately, the conflict in Southwest Asia was short, or the Field Artillery School's ability to provide effective training could have broken down.

In comparison, the Field Artillery Training Center literally mobilized the reserve system to its benefit with concurrence from TRADOC. To avoid taking on refresher training for IRR soldiers that would compete with the initial entry training mission for already scarce resources, the center brought in reserve field artillery training units to expand its instructor base, integrated them into its existing organization, and thereby, and used them to train the IRR soldiers. In the Field Artillery Training Center's case TRADOC allowed the system to work, but ironically it prevented the system from supporting the Field Artillery School.

CONCLUSION

Although diversity marked Fort Sill's response to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm because of differing responsibilities, unifying themes created a shared experience. As many Fort Sill leaders observed after the crisis had passed, direction from higher headquarters did not exist or was minimal at best. In a lengthy after action report, the Field Artillery Training Center pointed out that it never received definitive guidance. For the most part, only "incomplete information" was available, and even that was difficult to understand.[1] General Miller recounted:

. . . higher headquarters's guidance was just not available. a lot other than to tell me to send two active component

[1]Memorandum for Cdr, FATC, subj: FATC Desert Shield/Storm AAR, 26 Jul 91, pp. 20, 24, 30, 55, HRDC.

field artillery brigades to Saudi Arabia. III Corps Artil The post's Adjutant General likewise clamored about the dearth of clear and timely guidance.[3]

Although the inability to obtain lucid guidance was disconcerting and stemmed from the lack of a mobilization plan by the Army, General Miller found a bright spot. The absence of guidance from higher headquarters allowed III Corps Artillery and Fort Sill to do their jobs with a minimal amount of interference and simultaneously permitted U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), U.S. Army Training and

[2]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Miller, 2 Apr 91, p. 6, HRDC.

[3]Fact Sheet, subj: Desert Shield/Storm Operations within AG, 1 Mar 91, HRDC.

Doctrine Command (TRADOC), or the Department of the Army to concentrate on higher level issues without being distracted by constantly telling lower echelons how to do something.[4]

Interestingly, the Planning Branch in the Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities and the post Adjutant General added another crucial dimension to the issue of guidance. In a handwritten fact sheet of March 1991, the branch expressed its concern about dealing with guidance from too many sources.[5] That same month, the Adjutant General recorded that too many decision-makers -- FORSCOM, TRADOC, and others -- created confusion.[6]

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[4]Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Miller, 2 Apr 91, pp. 6-7, HRDC.

[5]Fact Sheet, subj: To Respond to Questions Posed by Cpt Hand for the CG's Oral History Interview, undated, HRDC.

[6]Fact Sheet, subj: Desert Shield/Storm Operations within AG, 1 Mar 91, HRDC.

Although the type of guidance was critical, personnel shortages and the nature of the deployment were two other themes that, perhaps, caused the greatest stress at Fort Sill. Because of personnel shortages in the Field Artillery School caused by the deployment of III Corps Artillery units and the mobilization of civilians, the former Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Colonel Marshall McRee, commented that it had to have access to individual mobilization augmentees "when the balloon goes up."[7] Reporting to TRADOC in July 1991, the Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization emphasized, "Requests made to TRADOC for call-up of IMAs [Individual Mobilization Augmentees] to support this HQ [Headquarters] were denied. . . . Their exclusion from DS 90 [Operation Desert Shield 1990] as added personnel needed to support DS 90 mobilization and deployment seriously strains the present personnel assets of this HQ."[8] Because Fort Sill had mobilization plans that included individual mobilization augmentees as active participants in base operations and training, the inability to use them detracted from the installation's ability to support Operation Desert Shield. In other words, as solid as Fort Sill's support to the Persian Gulf crisis was, employing the individual mobilization augmentees would have improved it. Without them the installation had to depend upon overtime and inexperienced "contract hires."[9]

With the continuing dependence on more sophisticated equipment and procedures, Fort Sill indicated that individual

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[7]Oral History Interview, Dastrup with McRee, 22 Jul 92, p. 8, HRDC.

[8]JULLS Long Report, 22 Jul 91, p. 24, HRDC.

[9]Ibid.; Memorandum for Cdr, USACATA, subj: AAR Desert Shield/Storm Phase I (Deployment/Mobilization), 10 Jul 91, p. 5, HRDC.

mobilization augmentees would become even more vital in a future mobilization or even a Presidential two hundred thousand call-up. To ensure utilizing these people in the future, Fort Sill indicated after the Persian Gulf Crisis was over that plans for a mobilization had to include employing the individual mobilization augmentees in base operations and the training base. Simply put, Fort Sill should not be denied using them.[10]

[10]Ibid., p. 6.

The Commanding General, U.S. Central Command, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's, decision to get as much combat power into the Persian Gulf as quickly as possible also complicated the installation's inability to use reserve personnel. At no one time did Fort Sill have the luxury of making a gradual transition from a peacetime footing to a wartime one as it had done during the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s. Under the pressure of the volatile crisis in Southwest Asia, the post mobilized its resources to support Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm virtually overnight and had to respond rapidly to constantly changing requirements with insufficient numbers of personnel to staff critical functions.[11]

Notwithstanding the unifying themes that certainly caused difficulties, Fort Sill's response demonstrated resilience. With little guidance at times and too much guidance at other times and with personnel shortages that forced excessive overtime, Fort Sill performed admirably well and demonstrated its ability to react rapidly and efficiently to a national emergency.

[11]Scales, et al, Certain Victory, p. 59.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAR, After Action Report
AC, Assistant Commandant/Active Component
AG, Adjutant General
AR, Army Regulation
BDE, Brigade
BN, Battalion
CALL, Center for Army Lessons Learned
CENTCOM, U.S. Central Command
CG, Commanding General
CONUS, Continental United States
CS, Combat Support
CSC, Combat Support Company
DA, Department of the Army
DEH, Directorate of Engineering and Housing
DET, Detachment
DOD, Department of Defense
DOL, Directorate of Logistics
DOTD, Directorate of Training and Doctrine
DPCA, Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities
DPTM, Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization
EOD, Explosive Ordnance Detachment
FA, Field Artillery
FATC, Field Artillery Training Center
FORSCOM, U.S. Army Forces Command
FSU, Finance Support Unit
HQDA, Headquarters, Department of the Army
HRDC, Historical Records and Document Collection
IMA, Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IRR, Individual Ready Reserve

JAG, Judge Advocate General
MEDDAC, U.S. Army Medical Department Activity
MLRS, Multiple-Launch Rocket System
MOS, Military Occupational Specialty
MP, Military Police
MSTL, Morris Swett Technical Library
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
POI, Program of Instruction
PSC, Personnel Support Company
RACH, Reynolds Army Community Hospital
RC, Reserve Component
S&S, Service and Supply
TC, Transportation Company
TPFDL, Time Phase Force Deployment List
TRADOC, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
USACATA, U.S. Army Combined Arms Training Activity
USAFACFS, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill
USAFAS, U.S. Army Field Artillery School
USAFATC, U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center
USAR, U.S. Army Reserve
USAREUR, U.S. Army, Europe
USCINCCENT, U.S. Commander in Chief, Central Command

APPENDIX A

ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS DEPLOYED FROM FORT SILL

Active		Reserve	
Unit	Deployed	Unit	Deployed
HHB, 75 FA Bde	28 Sep 90	1122 TC	2 Nov 90
6/27 FA Bn	5 Oct 90	2120 CSC	2 Nov 90
1/17 FA Bn	28 Sep 90	D/299 Eng	29 Oct 90
5/18 FA Bn	28 Sep 90	374 Med Av Det	5 Dec 90
HHB, 212 FA Bn	29 Sep 90	1011 S&S CO	29 Dec 90
3/18 FA Bn	4 Oct 90	44 Med Hosp	8 Jan 91
2/18 FA Bn	6 Oct 90	HHB 142 FA Bde	15 Jan 91
2/17 FA Bn	29 Sep 90	1/142 FA Bn	20 Jan 91
133 Ord Det	22 Sep 90	2/142 FA Bn	20 Jan 91
83 Chem Det	22 Sep 90	1/158 FA Bn	15 Jan 91
C/TAB 25FA Bn	22 Sep 90	145 Med Co	29 Dec 90
226 Maint Co	5 Oct 90	224 Maint Co	12 Jan 91
225 Maint Co	4 Oct 90	HHC 217 CS Bn	28 Dec 90
299 Eng Bn	17 Oct 90	701 PSC	13 Jan 91
230 FSU	17 Oct 90	1045 Ord Det	15 Jan 91
47 CSH	27 Aug 90	745 MP Co	11 Jan 91
52 EOD	23 Dec 90	304 CS Co	8 Jan 91
471 TC	18 Dec 90	1245 TC	31 Dec 90
163 Maint Det	20 Dec 90	1345 TC	26 Dec 90
		445 MP Co	5 Feb 91

Source: Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, EOC, subj: Addendum 1 to TRADOC Warfighter Support, 1 Sep 94, HRDC.

APPENDIX B

RESERVE UNITS MOBILIZED FOR BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT

Unit	Date Arrived at Fort Sill
49 FSU	25 Jan 91
HHD 381 AG	25 Jan 91
HHD 3/84 AR Bn	25 Jan 91
119 PSC	25 Jan 91
2/334 AR Bn	25 Jan 91
3/334 AR Bn	25 Jan 91
402 FA Tng Bde	25 Jan 91
402 USAR Recp Bde	25 Jan 91
218 JA Det	28 Jan 91
353 Med Det	28 Jan 91
245 Med Co	9 Dec 90
827 CS Co	18 Jan 91

Source: Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, EOC, subj: Addendum 1 to TRADOC Warfighter Support, 1 Sep 94, HRDC.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY OF SELECT SOURCES

To place Fort Sill's role in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm in perspective, a background on both operations is critical. John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey's (eds.) The Gulf War Assessed (1992) is a solid starting point for examining the crisis in the Persian Gulf. They have collection of articles written by experts on topics ranging from the Gulf crisis and world politics to the military doctrines of the coalition forces. For a discussion of the politics behind the war see Pierre Salinger and Eric Laurent's Secret Dossier: The Hidden Agenda Behind the Gulf War (1991). The staff of US News and World Reports has written a broad but controversial account of the war, entitled Triumph without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (1992). Unfortunately, the book lacks footnotes or a bibliography to support the authors' often startling conclusions. Consult James Blackwell's Thunder in the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War (1991), Roland Dann Reuther's The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis (1992), Harry G. Summers' On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (1992), Norman Friedman's Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (1991), Dilip Hiro's Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War (1992), Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabkeck's (eds.) The Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader (1991), and Bob Woodward's The Commanders (1991) for a broad view on the Gulf War. Another worthwhile book is Douglas Kellner's The Persian Gulf TV War (1992).

For those seeking the lessons learned from the War read Michael J. Mazarr, Don M. Snider, and James A. Blackwell, Jr.'s, Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned (1993) and Bruce Watson's Military Lessons of the Gulf War (1991).

Arthur H. Blair's At the War in the Gulf: A Chronology (1992) provides a daily account of the crisis. Focusing on the U.S. Army's role, Robert H. Scales, Jr.'s, Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (1993) tells the story of the modernization effort of the 1970s and 1980s as well as Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. For a less detailed but well-written account of the U.S. Army's participation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm see Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus's, eds., The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (1995).

For the leading personalities in the Gulf crisis see Roger Cohen and Claudio Gatti's In the Eye of the Storm: The Life of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf (1991), Richard Pyle's Schwarzkopf: The Man, The Mission, The Triumph (1991), and Robert D. Parrish and N.A. Andreacchio, Schwarzkopf: An Insider's View of the Commander and His Victory (1991). In Colin Powell: Soldier/Statesman -- Statesman/Soldier (1992) Howard Means analyzes the role that Powell played during the crisis.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command has two noteworthy studies on the crisis. Henry O. Malone, Jr.'s, (ed.) TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Preliminary Study (1992) furnishes a documented assessment of that command's support role in the crisis. Although John L. Romjue, Susan Canedy, and Anne W. Chapman's Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1993 (1993) is a general history of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command over a period of two decades, one chapter supplies a sound overview of the command's involvement in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Also, Steve E. Dietrich's "Desert Shield/Desert Storm: A Select Bibliography," Army History, Winter 1994, is a sound source for articles, monographs, and books published and in progress by U.S. Army historians.

The sources available for studying Fort Sill's role in

the crisis are extensive and are held in two primary collections: the Fire Support Research Center in the U.S. Army Field Artillery School and the Historical Records and Documents Collection in the Command Historian's Office, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill. The Fire Support Research Center has the daily message traffic, situation reports, and after action reports of many field artillery units that participated in the Gulf War, while the Historical Records and Document Collection has messages, memoranda, fact sheets, after action reports, newspaper articles, and oral history interviews of key Fort Sill personalities. Rather than list each individual report, article, message, memorandum, or fact sheet, the reader is